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Objectives: The outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV) infection in the Republic of Korea started from the index case who
developed fever after returning from the Middle East. He infected 26 cases in
Hospital C, and consecutive nosocomial transmission proceeded throughout the
nation. We provide an epidemiologic description of the outbreak, as of July 2015.
Methods: Epidemiological research was performed by direct interview of the
confirmed patients and reviewing medical records. We also analyzed the incu-
bation period, serial interval, the characteristics of superspreaders, and factors
associated with mortality. Full genome sequence was obtained from sputum
specimens of the index patient.
Results: A total of 186 confirmed patients with MERS-CoV infection across 16
hospitals were identified in the Republic of Korea. Some 44.1% of the cases were
patients exposed in hospitals, 32.8% were caregivers, and 13.4% were healthcare
personnel. The most common presenting symptom was fever and chills. The
estimated incubation period was 6.83 days and the serial interval was 12.5 days.
A total of 83.2% of the transmission events were epidemiologically linked to five
superspreaders, all of whom had pneumonia at presentation and contacted
hundreds of people. Older age [odds ratio (OR) Z 4.86, 95% confidence interval
(CI) 1.90e12.45] and underlying respiratory disease (OR Z 4.90, 95% CI 1.64
e14.65) were significantly associated with mortality. Phylogenetic analysis
showed that the MERS-CoV of the index case clustered closest with a recent virus
from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Conclusion: A single imported MERS-CoV infection case imposed a huge threat to
public health and safety. This highlights the importance of robust preparedness
and optimal infection prevention control. The lessons learned from the current
outbreak will contribute to more up-to-date guidelines and global health
security.uted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative
.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0) which permits non-commercial use, distribution, and repro-
ginal author and source are credited.
ase Control and Prevention. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
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Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a viral
respiratory illness caused by a novel human beta-
coronavirus (CoV) [1,2]. Since it was first reported
from Saudi Arabia in September 2012, 1,211 patients
have been detected worldwide, as of June 5, 2015 [3].
Secondary infection through human-to-human trans-
mission was confirmed from previous outbreaks [4,5,6],
and outbreaks in healthcare settings comprise a large
proportion of the outbreak [4,7]. Although the exact
route of transmission is still unclear, the respiratory
droplet route is currently most likely [8]. Until June
2015, most of the cases of MERS-CoV infection
occurred in the Middle East. Although a few cases were
reported in other countries, none exceeded five [3].
The outbreak of MERS-CoV infection in the Re-
public of Korea started when a 68-year-old South
Korean man developed fever and myalgia on May 11
after returning from a business trip to Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. MERS-CoV infection
was diagnosed on May 20. However, by then he had
already contacted approximately 600 people during his
visits to two clinics and admission to a secondary hos-
pital (Hospital C) located in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi-do.
Twenty-six cases of MERS-CoV infection were
confirmed among these initial contacts, and consecutive
transmission based on nosocomial infection rapidly
proceeded throughout the nation.
This unprecedented nationwide MERS-CoV outbreak
in the Republic of Korea imposed a huge threat not
merely to public health and safety, but also to the
economy, the tourist industry, and social activity. The
forecast for gross domestic product was downgraded by
0.3%, >135,000 foreign tourists canceled their visit to
the Republic of Korea, >2,700 schools were closed, and
>16,000 people underwent house quarantine. These
highlight the importance of appropriate infection control
intervention. However, although evidence-based inves-
tigation is essential for effective intervention, informa-
tion concerning the epidemiology of MERS-CoV
infection is currently limited. Herein, we provide an
overall epidemiologic description of the MERS-CoV
infection outbreak in the Republic of Korea, which is the
largest outbreak outside of the Arabian Peninsula.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Definitions
A person was defined as a confirmed MERS-CoV
infection case when there was laboratory evidence of
MERS-CoV infection, irrespective of clinical signs and
symptoms. The onset of illness was defined as the time
when a patient newly developed any symptom relating to
MERS-CoV infection such as fever, chills, myalgia,
shortness of breath, cough, sore throat, headache, nausea,vomiting, diarrhea, or abdominal pain. Cases were classi-
fied into healthcare personnel (doctor, nurse, and radio-
logic technologist), patient, caregiver (both paid and
family caregivers), and others. Close contact was defined
as a person who did not wear appropriate personal pro-
tective equipment (gloves, gown, N95 mask, goggles, or
face mask), and: (1) stayed within 2 m of the patient; (2)
stayed in the same room or ward with the patent; or (3)
directly contacted respiratory secretions of the patient [9].
In order to describe patientswho caused sizable subsequent
infection transmission, we arbitrarily defined a super-
spreading event as one patient transmitting the infection to
more than four patients. The patient who caused the
superspreading event was defined as a superspreader.
2.2. Data source and assessment of exposure
We carried out an epidemiological research by direct
interview of the patients who were confirmed with
MERS-CoV infection. Data concerning demographic
characteristics, the initial symptom and date of its onset,
healthcare facilities for the case visited, presence of
personal protective equipment, and a list of contacts
were collected. The duration and route of exposure were
further determined through reviewing closed circuit
television and tracking the health insurance review and
assessment service, global positioning system of the
patient’s cellular phone, and recent credit card inquiry
transactions. Based on these data, potential exposures
were identified for each confirmed case. When a
confirmed case had multiple potential exposures, the
most probable exposure was determined through the
consensus of the authors. Simultaneously, we thoroughly
reviewed the medical records of the patients in order to
identify underlying comorbidities, radiological evidence
of pneumonia, aerosol generating procedures, and final
prognosis. National health insurance data was used to
validate underlying diseases of the confirmed patients.
2.3. Clinical samples and laboratory
confirmation
Sputum or tracheal-aspirate samples of the patients
were collected in a sterile cap and transferred to qualified
national, local, or commercial facilities immediately. For
patients whose sputum specimen was not acquirable, a
specimen from a nasopharyngeal or oropharyngeal swab
was obtained. Laboratory diagnosis was performed ac-
cording to the World Health Organization guidelines of
the MERS laboratory test [10]. For molecular detection
of MERS-CoV RNA, two real-time reverse-transcription
polymerase chain reaction assays targeting an upstream
of MERS-CoV envelope protein gene and the open
reading frame 1a (ORF 1a) gene were used [11].
2.4. Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis
Full genome sequence using Sanger and Illumina
sequencing was obtained from direct polymerase chain
reaction products using sputum specimens from the
MERS-CoV outbreak in the Republic of Korea, 2015 271index patient. Imported high quality reads were mapped
against the JX869059 reference sequence using the CLC
Genomic Workbench Version 8.0.1 (CLC bio, Aarhus,
Denmark). Fasta consensus sequences obtained from
deep sequencing and a group of 15 MERS-CoV complete
genome sequences retrieved from GenBank were aligned
using MAFFT (Multiple Alignment using Fast Fourier
Transform) algorithm [12]. Phylogenetic reconstructions
were performed by maximum likelihood criterion using
RAxML (Randomized Axelerated Maximum Likeli-
hood) version 8.2.6 (https://github.com/stamatak/
standard-RAxML) [13]. Trees were visualized using
FigTree v.1.4 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree).
2.5. Statistical analysis
The incubation period was estimated by identifying
the earliest and latest time of possible exposure and the
time of symptom onset for each case. Treating these
times as interval-censored estimates of the incubation
period for each person, we fit a log-normal distribution
to these data using maximum-likelihood techniques. We
then examined the robustness of our estimates with
multiple definitions of onset and with the exclusion of
particular cases. The serial interval was estimated by
identifying the times of symptom onset in the patient
and in the person who transmitted the infection (infec-
tedeinfector pairs) and then fitting a log-normalFigure 1. Epidemiologic curve of 178 confirmed cases of Middle
in the Republic of Korea, 2015. Panel A (integrated curve) depicts t
color indicates the index patient, and three main clusters (Hospital C
green, and purple, respectively. Eight cases whose date of sympto
excluded. Panel B shows the epidemic curve of each of the three m
patterns. An additional case in Hospital H whose stage of transmisdistribution to these interval-censored data [14]. We
estimated the medians and 5th and 95th percentiles of the
incubation period and the serial interval using the
quintiles of log-normal distribution fit to each data set.
The Chi-square test and Fisher’s exact test were used, as
appropriate, to compare variables such as age, sex,
symptoms at presentation, and underlying disease in
association with mortality. Risk factors associated with
mortality were assessed using logistic regression anal-
ysis. All statistical tests were two-tailed and were
considered statistically significant at p < 0.05. Statistical
analysis was performed using Microsoft Excel 2007
(Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA, USA), SPSS Statistics
Software, version 20.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY,
USA), and R statistical package, version 2.15.1 (R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).3. Results
3.1. Description of the outbreak
A total of 186 confirmed patients of MERS-CoV
infection were identified in the Republic of Korea be-
tween May 20, 2015 and July 13, 2015. The outbreak
proceeded with three phases of transmission and spread
to 16 healthcare facilities (Figure 1). The median age of
confirmed MERS-CoV patients was 55 yearsEast respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection
he overall epidemiologic curve by date of symptom onset. Red
, Hospital H, and Hospital M and N) are depicted with yellow,
m onset is uncertain or who are still under investigation are
ain clusters. Stages of transmission are expressed by different
sion is uncertain is excluded.
Table 1. Demographic and clinical features of 186 cases
of laboratory-confirmed Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection,
Republic of Korea, 2015.
Characteristics No. of patients
Sex, n (%)
Male 111 (59.7)
Female 75 (40.3)
Age (y), median (IQR) 55 (42e66)
65y, n (%) 55 (29.6)
Case classification, n (%)
Healthcare personnel 25 (13.4)
Patient 82 (44.1)
Caregiver 61 (32.8)
Others* 18 (9.7)
Symptoms at presentation, n (%)
Fever/chills 138 (74.2)
Cough 33 (17.7)
Dyspnea 10 (5.4)
Myalgia 47 (25.3)
Headache 16 (8.6)
GI symptomsy 24 (12.9)
Sputum 14 (7.5)
Sore throat 8 (4.3)
Comorbidities, n (%)
Anyz 102 (54.8)
Respiratory diseasex 23 (12.4)
Diabetes mellitus 52 (28.0)
Cardiac diseasek 42 (22.6)
Chronic kidney disease 9 (4.8)
Malignancy 43 (23.1)
Known setting of contact, n (%){
Healthcare facility 178 (98.0)
Household 1 (0.5)
Ambulance 3 (1.5)
Time from symptom onset to
laboratory confirmation in days,
median (IQR)
5 (3e9)
Time from symptom onset to
death in days, median (IQR)
15 (10e20)
Outcome as of July 13, 2015, n (%)
Recovered 131 (70.4)
Ongoing treatment in hospital 19 (10.2)
Died 36 (19.4)
*Includes visitors, hospital security agents etc; yAny one or more among
the following symptoms: nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, gastric discomfort,
loss of appetite; zAny one or more among respiratory diseases, including
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma, diabetes mellitus,
cardiac disease, chronic kidney disease, and malignancy; xIncludes
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma; kIncludes ischemic
heart disease, arrhythmia and heart failure; {With exclusion of the index
patient and three cases of which the precise setting of contact is un-
identified. IQR Z interquartile range.
Figure 2. Incubation period of Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection outbreak in the
Republic of Korea, 2015. Panel A shows the density estimation
of incubation periods with gamma distribution. Panel B shows
the empirical cumulative density estimation of incubation
period.
272 Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(Interquartile range 42e66), and 111 patients (59.7%)
were male (Table 1). Twenty-five (13.4%) cases were
healthcare personnel, 82 (44.1%) were patients who had
been exposed during admission or at clinics, and
61(32.8%) were caregivers. Common symptoms at
presentation were fever/chills (74.2%) and myalgia(25.3%). Diabetes mellitus was the most common co-
morbidity (28.0%), followed by malignancy (23.1%).
The majority (98%) of patients were infected with
MERS-CoV in healthcare facilities.
3.2. Incubation period and serial interval
The incubation period of confirmed cases was 6.83
days [95% confidence interval (CI), 6.31e7.36]
(Figure 2); distributions that were fit to our observed data
indicated that 95% of infected patients would have an
onset of symptoms by Day 13.48 (95% CI of 95th
percentile, 12.23e14.73), whereas 5% would have an
onset of symptoms by Day 2.27 (95% CI of 5th percen-
tile, 1.98e2.48). We estimated that the serial interval
was 12.5 days (95% CI, 11.8e13.2) (Figure 3). The
distributions that were fit to our observed data indicate
that the serial interval was 20.65 days in 95% of cases
(95% CI of 95th percentile, 19.15e22.15) and 6.15 days
in 5% of cases (95% CI of 5th percentile, 3.65e8.65).
3.3. Chains of transmission
From May 15 through May 17, the index patient
infected 26 secondary cases in Hospital C (Figure 4). An
initial epidemiological investigation focused on the
healthcare personnel, family members, and the patients
who either had prolonged close contact or shared the
same hospital room with the index patient. On May 28,
as MERS-CoV infection was diagnosed among patients
in other rooms, investigation was extended to those who
stayed in the same ward. However, eight secondary
patients who had not been detected already moved to
another ward and infected 10 tertiary patients. Some of
Figure 3. Serial interval of Middle East respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection outbreak in the
Republic of Korea, 2015. Panel A shows the density estimation
of serial intervals using gamma distribution. Panel B shows the
empirical cumulative density estimation of serial intervals.
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surveillance was performed to trace these patients and
we were able to find tertiary transmission across seven
different hospitals. Patient 14 infected 80 tertiary cases
in Hospital H, Patient 15 infected six tertiary cases in
Hospital L, and Patient 16 infected 24 tertiary cases in
Hospitals M and N, respectively. After the imple-
mentation of infection control interventions, a small
number of quaternary transmissions occurred, and
nearly half of these cases were caused by Patient 76 who
was infected in Hospital H.
3.4. Characteristics of superspreader
Five patients met the definition of a superspreader
(Table 2). A total of 83.2% of the transmission events
were epidemiologically linked to these five patients. The
median age of the superspreaders was 41 years (range,
41e68 years). Four were men and the median body mass
index was 24 (range, 19e30). Comorbidity was observed
in two cases; asthma in Patient 1 and multiple myeloma
and diabetes mellitus in Patient 76. All cases were febrile
and had pneumonia at presentation. Patient 1, Patient 14,
and Patient 16 who had a severe cough infected 28 cases,
85 cases, and 23 cases, respectively. By contrast, Patient
15 and Patient 76 who rarely coughed infected six cases
and 11 cases, respectively. Patient 14 mostly stayed in
the emergency department, Patient 1, Patient 15, and
Patient 26 were mainly hospitalized in multipatient
rooms, and Patient 76 stayed in both. The median
duration of hospitalization was 10 days (2e11days) and
the number of close contacts ranged from 277 to 805.
Patient 14 wore an N95 mask intermittently, whereas
other superspreaders did not wear any type of mask.3.5. Mortality cases
As of July 13, 36 deaths have occurred and the
mortality rate was 19.4%. In the univariate analysis,
older age (65years) was strongly associated with
mortality (Table 3). History of diabetes mellitus, ma-
lignancy, and the presence of underlying respiratory
disease (i.e., asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease), cardiac disease (i.e., ischemic heart disease,
arrhythmia, and/or heart failure), and chronic kidney
disease were also significantly associated with mortality.
However, in the multivariate regression analysis,
adjusted for sex, age, and underlying diseases, only
older age [odds ratio (OR)Z 4.86, 95% CI 1.90e12.45]
and underlying respiratory disease (ORZ 4.90, 95% CI
1.64e14.65) appeared to be significant.
3.6. Phylogenetic analysis
The MERS-CoV of the index case produced the best
match with the virus from an outbreak in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia in February 2015 (Riyadh_KKUH_0708_
20150225) by pairwise comparisons (Figure 5). The
nucleotide identity was 99.61%. Phylogenetic analysis
of the 16 MERS-CoV complete genomes showed that
MERS-CoV/KOR/KNIH/001_05_2015 and Riyadh_K-
KUH_0708_20150225 are the closest relatives of vi-
ruses from Qatar and Hafr-Al-Batin in the 2013
outbreak.4. Discussion
The outbreak of MERS-CoV infection in the Re-
public of Korea is the first of its kind and the largest
known outbreak outside the Arabian Peninsula [15].
Because knowledge on the nature of the virus and its
mode of transmission was limited, the extensive spread
of MERS-CoV infection in the early phase of the
outbreak raised great concern. However, the present
outbreak could be understood within the range of
knowledge from previous outbreaks. The outbreak
progressed in the manner of human-to-human trans-
mission, was amplified under the healthcare setting,
and showed heterogeneity in transmission. However,
delayed diagnosis and the unique medical and patient-
care system of the Republic of Korea caused super-
spreading events.
Nosocomial transmission has been a main charac-
teristic of MERS-CoV infection. The rapid increase of
MERS cases since 2013 resulted from healthcare-
associated outbreaks in the Middle East [4,8]. Trans-
mission occurred during admission or outpatient visits,
at emergency departments, or at outpatient facilities
including renal dialysis units [4,7,16]. In addition to the
transmission between patients or healthcare personnel,
transmission to hospital visitors was also reported [6,7].
Nosocomial transmission was also predominant in the
present outbreak. Of 182 confirmed cases of MERS-
Figure 4. Transmission map of 182 confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in the Republic of Korea. The numbers within the red
circles are identifiers of notable patients who caused succeeding MERS-CoV infection. The site and the duration of exposure by these patients are indicated in colored boxes. Gray boxes
depict the time periods that new cases occurred by date of symptom onset at each site. Black arrows represent how each spreader moved to the next site of transmission. The transmission
route of Patient 119 is uncertain. Four cases still under investigation are excluded.
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Table 2. Characteristics of superspreaders of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection outbreak in the
Republic of Korea, 2015.
Patient number 1 14 15 16 76
Infected no. of patients 28 85 6 23 11
Age (y) 68 35 35 41 75
Sex Male Male Male Male Female
Body mass index 27 30 24 24 19
Underlying disease Hypertension, asthma No No Familial adenomatous
polyposis
Diabetes mellitus,
multiple myeloma
Exposed duration (d)* 10 9 10 11 2
Exposed setting GW (27 cases)
OPD (1 case)
ER (78 cases)
GW (4 cases)
Other (3 cases)
GW (6 cases) GW (22 cases)
Other (1 case)
ER (4 cases)
GW (3 cases)
Other (4 cases)
Number of close
contacts
626 594 304 277 805
Personal protective
equipment
No Intermittent No No No
Pneumoniay Present Present Present Present Present
Cough Frequent Frequent Rare Frequent Rare
Prognosis Survived Survived Survived Survived Expired
Aerosol-generating
procedure
No No No No No
*Exposed duration is defined as the period from symptom onset to the date of proper isolation; yPneumonia detected from chest radiograph at the moment of
investigation. ER Z emergency room; GW Z general ward; OPD Z outpatient department.
MERS-CoV outbreak in the Republic of Korea, 2015 275CoV infection whose setting of contact is identified, all
but one case were infected in healthcare facilities or in
ambulances. However, the range of exposure was more
extensive than that of outbreaks in the Middle East,
infecting multiple visitors, radiologic technologists,
hospital security agents in emergency departments,
emergency medical technicians, and caregivers. To date,
there was no evidence of sustained transmission in the
community.
MERS-CoV transmission showed heterogeneity of
infectiousness as observed in severe acute respiratory
syndrome [4,17,18,19]. Similarly, the majority (91.3%)
of cases resulted in no transmission and the remaining
small proportion caused most of the transmission eventsTable 3. Risk factors associated with in-hospital mortality in 18
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection, 2015.
Variable
Univariate logistic regressi
OR 95%CI
Sex, male 1.44 0.67e3.11
Age,  65 y 7.67 3.45e17.04
Case classification,
patient
3.17 1.47e6.83
Respiratory disease*
,y 6.27 2.48e15.83
Diabetes mellitus 2.91 1.436e6.20
Cardiac diseasey 4.43 2.02e9.70
Chronic kidney disease 5.84 1.48e23.0
Malignancy 2.63 1.20e5.76
*Includes chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma; yIncludes ischemic
by gender, age, and underlying diseases. CI Z confidence interval; OR Z oddin this outbreak. However, superspreading events were
more prominent than previous reports. Prolonged dura-
tion of exposure before diagnosis and proper isolation,
practice of seeking care at multiple healthcare facilities,
frequent interhospital transfer, significant numbers of
paid caregivers, and large numbers of contacts in large
crowded tertiary referral hospitals might have contrib-
uted to multiple spreading events. Moreover, the custom
of family members and friends to accompany or visit
patients, and to provide care with staying in the same
hospital rooms (mostly multibed rooms) or in the
crowded emergency rooms, may have also contributed
to the increased number of contacts. Regarding clinical
manifestation, all patients who resulted in multiple6 patients with laboratory-confirmed Middle East respiratory
on Multivariate logistic regression
p OR 95%CI p
0.434 1.56 0.62e3.91 0.33
<0.0001 4.86 1.90e12.45 0.001
0.003 0.82 0.27e2.50 0.73
<0.0001 4.90 1.64e14.65 0.004
0.006 1.37 0.55e3.45 0.49
<0.0001 2.21 0.86e5.67 0.09
0.012 2.30 0.44e11.94 0.32
0.015 1.92 0.75e4.86 0.16
heart disease, dysrhythmia, and heart failure. Multivariate analysis adjusted
s ratio.
Figure 5. Evolutionary history of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). A phylogenetic tree was
constructed using RAxML. The scale bar shows evolutionary distance inferred by RAxML algorithm. The MERS-CoV in the
Republic of Korea outbreak is indicated by a red cycle. Support for the ML phylogenetic trees was evaluated using 1,000 bootstrap
replicates. Note numbers represent % bootstrap replicates >70%.
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cough infected more cases than others who rarely
coughed. There was no evidence of viral mutation which
can modify the mode of transmission or virulence [11].
The outbreak progressed in the manner of human-to-
human transmission. However, it is still uncertain
whether the transmission occurred merely through the
respiratory droplet route or through another route of
transmission (i.e., airborne transmission). Although the
respiratory droplet route is currently regarded as the
most likely route of transmission [8], the outbreaks in
Hospital C and Hospital H were far more extensive
compared with previous hospital outbreaks, and sur-
veillances for other possible routes are under process.
Irrespective of the route of transmission, viral trans-
mission actually occurred between rooms in the same
ward and throughout the emergency room of Hospital H,
which is as wide as 1,970 m2. Transmission across
rooms has been previously reported [4], but the present
outbreak demonstrated its high feasibility and magni-
tude. To successfully control the MERS-CoV outbreak,
it is essential to implement droplet and contact pre-
cautions and trace every individual, including patients,
healthcare personnel, and visitors, who stayed in the
same ward or same emergency room.Clinical presentation in this outbreak was similar to
the previous outbreaks in the Middle East [7]. Fever is
the most common symptom along with myalgia. It is
noteworthy that only 12.9% of patients had gastroin-
testinal symptoms, which is relatively lower than its
prevalence of 20e30% documented elsewhere [4]. This
may partly be explained by the limitation of current data
which is based on primary epidemiologic investigation
reports. The estimated incubation period of the present
outbreak was 6.83 days, which is similar to that of
previous outbreaks [4]. Estimated distribution indicated
that most of the infected patients would have symptoms
by Day 13.48, and this may reinforce the current policy
regarding the duration of quarantine. Estimated serial
interval was 12.5 days in this outbreak, which was
longer than that of 7.6 days in the previous report [4].
Compared with the previous report, our results have
strength in the aspect that they are based on a larger
sample size and every case is confirmed by a laboratory
test. However, we might have wrongly attributed tertiary
or quaternary infection to secondary or tertiary infection
in the process of determining the most probable expo-
sure, and thus overestimated the serial interval.
Risk factors for mortality include older age and un-
derlying respiratory diseases, which is similar to the
MERS-CoV outbreak in the Republic of Korea, 2015 277previous study [20]. In our study and other studies alike,
patients aged 65 years were eight to nine times more
likely to die from MERS-CoV infection [20]. Although
evidence suggests that chronic kidney diseases are
known to be associated with a particularly higher fatality
in MERS-CoV infected patients [21], this was not
evident in our multivariate analysis. Although underly-
ing diseases of the initial epidemiologic report were
cross validated with the national health insurance data-
base, complete clinical data needs to be supplemented in
order to draw a more accurate picture on the association
of underlying diseases and prognosis.
In the early phase of the outbreak, containment mea-
sures were conducted in accordance with current inter-
national guidelines which recommended identifying and
monitoring close contacts [22,23]. Identification and
monitoring of contacts were limited to healthcare
personnel who directly managed the index patient, and
patients and their families who were in the same hospital
roomwith the index patient. However, when a patient was
first confirmed beyond this initial criterion, containment
measures had to be reestablished to include a wider
spectrum of contacts. Unfortunately, this was not timely
enough to prevent infected patients, including super-
spreaders, from discharging from or transferring to other
hospitals. This initial flaw in identifying the appropriate
population at risk and delayed response with regards to
management of superspreaders, along with suboptimal
infection prevention and control in healthcare facilities,
eventually culminated in the infection of >180 patients.
Efforts were made to reinforce containment mea-
sures. Active surveillance and contact management
including contact identification, listing, and follow up on
all contacts on a daily basis was conducted. Confirmed
cases were isolated and treated in designated hospitals
while exposed individuals were quarantined in their
homes for 14 days after last exposure. A MERS-CoV
test was immediately conducted if the exposed in-
dividuals reported suspicious symptoms. Infection con-
trol practices in hospitals were reinforced and public
awareness was increased. The number of new cases has
slowly declined towards the end of June.
Our study has several limitations. Although clinical
features of the infected patients were largely based on
information attained through accurate epidemiologic
investigation, this does not provide knowledge as to the
entire clinical course of respective patients. Given this,
information regarding clinical data and underlying dis-
eases was validated and supplemented with other reliable
sources such as health insurance data and medical re-
cords, to minimize the effect of such limitations. There
were also a few patients with atypical or no symptoms and
several cases whose dates of onset were unclear, which
also warrants further investigation. The strength of this
study is that, to our knowledge, this is the first report
describing the epidemiologic and clinical features of 186
lab-confirmed patients of the outbreak. A wealth ofinformation sources such as closed circuit television,
location detection technologies, as well as credit card
inquiry transactions, were collected and analyzed.
A single MERS-CoV infection case from abroad
resulting in a sizable outbreak in the healthcare setting
of a developed country highlights the importance of
robust preparedness, vigilant surveillance, and optimal
infection prevention control in hospitals. Although
evidence-based technical guidelines for investigation are
an integral part of effective containment, only limited
information is currently available on the transmission
dynamics of MERS-CoV. It is anticipated that the les-
sons learned from this outbreak will contribute to more
up-to-date guidelines of MERS-CoV investigation and
global health security.Conflicts of interest
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